JUSTIFYING CIVIL DESOBEDIENCE IN A POSITIVIST APPROACH
This paper’s goal is to demonstrate that civil disobedience can be treated as a valid form of dissent in a positivist approach to legal philosophy. Two possible objections emerge against our proposal: the fact that (1) the positivist perspective could not allow appeals deriving from social causes to influence the legal system and, for that reason, (2) civil disobedience could only be regarded as a potential pathology of the legal system. We shall argue that these two objections are mistaken. To that end we will make use of concepts coined by H. L. Hart. With them we will demonstrate that the claims forwarded through civil disobedience actually presuppose the existence of a legal system. For this reason, it cannot present the above risk.
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