Reflective Equilibrium is enough. Against the need for pre-selecting “considered judgments”
Keywords:reflective equilibrium, considered judgments, Rawls, methods of practical philosophy, epistemic filter, moral justification
In this paper, we focus on one controversial element of the method of reflective equilibrium, namely Rawls’ idea that the commitments that enter the justificatory procedure should be pre-selected or filtered: According to him, only considered judgements should be taken into account in moral philosophy. There are two camps of critics of this filtering process: 1) Critics of reflective equilibrium: They reject the Rawlsian filtering process as too weak and seek a more reliable one, which would actually constitute a distinct epistemic method. 2) Proponents of reflective equilibrium: They reject the Rawlsian filtering process as too exclusionary. We defend RE against its critics, arguing that the method can secure reasonable commitments without depending on a strong external filtering process. However, we side with the critical proponents of reflective equilibrium and argue that without the Rawlsian weak filtering process, RE is more plausible both as a general method as well as in the context of moral philosophy.
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